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1INTRODUCTION
This essay deals with the role of the state in Pakistan More 
particularly, it examines the functioning of those state institutions 
which are most relevant to the tragic partitioning of Pakistan in 
1971, and which may yet contribute to the future vivisection of this 
still-new country Pakistan remains a country on the knife edge of 
destruction— a surprising and tragic fact when one considers that 
Pakistan inherited a reasonably coherent set of administrative 
institutions from British India, the idea of Pakistan was quite 
firmly held before the state was created and it has always had 
adequate material and human resources to sustain itself In brief, 
Pakistan is important because it is the first major post-colonial 
state to have been literally broken into two successor parts, and is 
thus both an example for others and a precedent for its own troubled 
population
This essay makes several basic assumptions The first is that 
while institutions may be natural associations ( m  the Aristotelean 
sense) their contribution to state building is not necessarily 
positive The ’’state" is not an abstract, value-free entity except 
when we are conceptualizing it, in fact, states everywhere serve some 
interests better (or worse) than others Further, states also 
influence and shape perceptions of what these separate and joint 
interests are As Aristotle argued--and as President Zia 
believes— there is a positive duty of the state to educate, mold, 
shape, and change
Second, politics everywhere--but perhaps more visibly in
2Pakistan— rests upon a mix of consent and coercion This may take the 
form of the threat of withdrawal of consent— or the threat of the 
application of force— but the two are omnipresent When consent is 
absent, coercion shows its face, usually m  the form of the 
application of military power or the threat of that power Thus, the
ù
military or police forces are only faintly removed from the center of 
political life m  any state, but particularly one with such a long 
tradition of rule by the sword as Pakistan
Third, the institutions of the state (including the military) are 
not autonomous, but rest on a broader political culture When that 
political culture is mixed or is changing, then institutions may come 
into conflict or become ineffective This is so because a change m  
the state structure of power will usually favor one institution over 
another, and important ideological, ethnic, regional, religious or 
other groups are associated with particular institutions m  the 
protection of their interests
This is obvious, but the question which seems to be of great 
immediate practical importance in Pakistan is whether an institution 
created to serve one end, and reflect one value or goal, can be 
adapted to serve another Or, can such an institution survive when 
sister institutions decline or disappear9 This question is 
particularly pressing in a state ruled by military professionals who 
seem to be dismantling those very professions and political and 
administrative institutions which give the modern military 
its purpose and direction
I STATE BUILDING IN PAKISTAN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
In comparative terms, it is easy to pinpoint some qualities of
the state in Pakistan which are unique and some which Pakistan shares 
with its neighbors and other countries By "qualities" we refer 
especially to the powers of resource extraction (which are only 
fair a landed aristocracy has prevented the kind of redistribution 
found even m  India), "mechanical" abilities ( the development and 
maintenance of civil facilities such as roads, the rail system, postal 
services, waterways, irrigation, etc — which have declined somewhat, 
but by international standards are still quite good), and finally the 
powers of analysis, self-criticism, and improvement This is the 
capacity of the state and its constituent institutions to recognize 
internal defects and remedy them— which in Pakistan has never been 
good and may have deteriorated across the board (with a few 
exceptions, such as the military)
We shall return to some of these qualities below, but it is 
important to note three unique features of the Pakistani state its 
special ideological underpinning, it’s special physical shape (until 
1971), and it’s traumatic vivisection in that same year
Pakistan is the only country formed as an "Islamic" state 
However, its Islamic legacy is mixed Many who fought for Pakistan 
were not themselves orthodox Muslims, or did not want to see Pakistan 
actually guided and structured according to Islamic principles, but 
saw Pakistan as a state where they would be free from the 
domination of their more numerous Hindu neighbors The shift from the 
concept of a state run largely along British Indian secular principles 
(albeit with a superficial Islamic personality) to a Pakistan which 
became a laboratory of Islam occurred after Independence 
Although Mohammed All Jmnah is regarded as the father of the country
4the state is increasingly under the influence of the ideas of Sir 
Mohammad Iqbal, who insisted that a Pakistan which was not constructed 
along Islamic lines was unthinkable and undesirable
This renewed concern with Islam as an organizing principle of 
state structure has led to the same problems faced by other analogous 
states Israel is the most interesting contemporary example but 
Pakistan officials and generals also point out the difficulties faced 
by the Catholic states of Europe They also had to adjust the 
relationship between church, religion, and state apparatus, the 
Catholic states (unlike Israel) also had the problem of 
non-territoriality, and the phenomenon of two or more religion-based 
states pursuing different policies with different state structures 
(Pakistanis are acutely aware that their "Islamic practices are often 
at variance with those of Saudi Arabia or Iran)
Pakistan was for many years divided into two disparate and 
physically separated parts Paraphrasing Freud, territory is destiny, 
and had a hostile India not been interposed between East and West 
Pakistan it is unlikely that the breakup of 1971 would have occurred 
But the important lesson of that disaster is not that physical 
separation alone is critical (for no other state, except the 
archipelagic Indonesia faced a situation quite like this), but that 
physical separation multiplied the impact of ethnic diversity on the 
state More crudely stated, the Pakistan government was unable to 
appiy the necessary force to suppress Bengali discontent simply 
because of the distances involved, there is no doubt that it would 
have done so if Bengal had been contiguous to West Pakistan or if it 
could have been insulated from Indian influence
5The lessons of Bengal are deeply imprinted on the minds of those 
who have ruled Pakistan since 1972 They are far more sensitive to 
Baluch and Pathan grievances than they would have been had Bangladesh 
not been created, yet it was a civilian (Bhutto) who used what was 
certainly excessive force m  dealing with the Baluchis, and a soldier 
(Zia) who has taken a more conciliatory line Some Baluchi leaders 
regard this as merely a tactical difference and argue that the 
ultimate end is Punjabi dominance (as Bangladeshi leaders argued that 
Yahya Khan’s regime was merely serving West Pakistani and Punjabi 
interests) Other’s will deal with this problem at greater length, 
but we should point out that ethnic and regional divisions still 
present the major challenge to state integrity and the very survival 
of Pakistan as we now know it While external intervention was 
crucial in resolving the civil war of 1971 (and may be crucial m  the 
future if the Soviets or Indians decide to actively support dissident 
groups) the underlying weakness was already there
If Pakistan presents some striking qualities m  its ideological 
and physical-ethnic makeup, it does share many qualities with other 
important states It now has an almost entirely Muslim population 
(before 1971» East Pakistan had a sizeable Hindu minority), and while 
Sunnis dominate, there is an important Shia community As in other 
Muslim countries this has led to certain problems of enforcement of 
Islamic laws of taxation since Sunni and Shia legal codes differ in 
several important respects The Presidency of Pakistan has always 
been reserved for a Muslim, but the small non-Muslim communities have 
usually found representation in cabinet and parliament More 
problematical has been the treatment of some Islamic sectsthat have
6been declared non-Muslim
Pakistan also shares a number of characteristics with Iran, 
India and other regional states It is multi-ethnic and 
multi-lingual with each major grouping (Punjabi, Pathan, Sindhi, and 
Baluchi) having their own regional assembly, governor, educational 
system, and administrative cadre However, the imbalance between the 
Punjab and the remaining three groups is more akin to Persian 
dominance in Iran than anything found m  India, this Punjabi dominance 
is exacerbated by a predominately Punjabi military establishment 1
Further, many of Pakistan's ethnic groups spill over across state 
frontiers Pathans, Baluchis, Kashmiris, and Punjabis are found m  
Afghanistan, Iran and India, and sub-nationalist movements are not far 
beneath the surface in the case of the first three groups This ethnic 
overlap has one overwhelming implication for the Pakistani state its 
foreign policy, especially vis a vis its neighbors, is to a great 
degree a function of domestic politics— the two cannot be separated 
Similarly, Pakistan's treatment of its own population (especially in 
Kashmir, Baluchistan, and the Northwest Frontier) is necessarily of 
concern to its neighbors
Finally, Pakistan shares with several states the British legacy 
of constitutionalism and civilian control over the military, despite 
the fact that it has been a state without a constitution for most of 
its history and that it has been run by the military more often than 
not This is a paradox, but an important one There are those who 
argue that Pakistan is destined to be like Iran, Iraq, or 
Syria— oscillating between bondage to the military and chaos My own 
understanding is quite different Among those institutions still
7functioning in Pakistan (including the military) there remains a deep 
commitment to constitutional civilian government, although these same 
Pakistanis are perplexed as to how to establish and maintain such a 
government Like most good ideas this is one that will not die and 
Pakistan is for years likely to be a state in perpetual search of a 
formula which allows the military to return to their barracks
II INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION
There are a number of excellent surveys of the growth and decay 
of Pakistan’s key political and administrative institutions  ^ We 
need only survey their conclusions and perhaps add to the debate by 
noting how the one institution which has dominated Pakistani 
politics— the military— has itself fared over thirty-five years
Political parties are everywhere multi-functional institutions 
They not only serve as "transmission belts” for public opinion and 
group interest, but they are also (especially in communist countries) 
mobilizing agents for the state and instruments of change In 
democracies, power rests upon the ultimate authority of the people, 
but democratic theorists have almost always argued that there must be 
1) an informed and increasingly educated population, and 2) some 
degree of consensus on basic issues
Pakistan's parties have never been able to fulfill half of these 
functions The party-movement which created the state—  the 
Muslim League— was most influential in those areas of British 
India which did not go to Pakistan While many of the Muslim League's 
leaders emigrated to Pakistan their mass base remained m  India This, 
coupled with the personalistic quality of the party to begin with, led 
to its rapid decline as a political force Yet no other mass party
8took its place and the political system of Pakistan was dominated by 
groups that were parties in name only Except for the Awami League 
(and later, Bhutto’s Pakistan People's Party, both ot which were 
regional parties), Pakistan's political system was run by 
individuals with little popular support Parties were the vehicles 
for local leaders, and were never far from their feudal model The 
notions of a legitimate opposition, of parties as permanent 
institutions rather than as vehicles for individual power, and of 
consensus on vital issues, were all absent Nor was the 
ideology of Islam widely attractive except as a common ground on which 
to declare a non-Indian identity
The likely fragility of Pakistan's party system was recognized by 
Jinnah before the state became independent Unlike Jawaharlal Nehru 
(who became India's Prime Minister under a Governor-General) Jinnah 
chose to become Pakistan's Governor-General " m  this way he proposed 
to rise above parliamentary responsibility and direct from his own 
heights the evolution of Pakistan's political institutions But 
Jinnah died shortly after independence, and the parliamentary path was 
pursued with a vengeance by his successor, Liaquat All Khan and other 
politicians for nearly ten years, until Ayub Khan’s coup ended 
Pakistan's unsteady democracy m  1958
Ayub moved because the system was not working there were no 
restraints of individual or institutional loyalty, party organization, 
or public responsibility upon individual ambition, "the only guide to 
action which remained, and remained by default, was individual self 
interest, holding office became the highest goal "
From the perspective of the civil service, the military, and most
9other professionals and institution-builders in Pakistan, the army's 
coup came as a relief and an opportunity to rebuild Pakistan's 
political institutions Ayub Khan eventually turned himself into a 
political leader (with some initial success) and ruled until 1969, 
only to be displaced by his army commander-in- chief, Yahya Khan
Ayub s reign was important in the prominence of civilian 
advisors, and was in fact more of a bureaucratic-military alliance 
than simple military rule Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy had been 
greatly enlarged after independence, but retained the importance it 
had under the British (again, in India, both the civil and military 
bureaucrats were reduced m  importance and status vis a vis civilian 
politicians) In a very real sense Ayub's rule more closely resembled 
the British Raj in its strong central direction and assumption of 
bureaucratic omnipotence It did produce several years of stability and 
economic growth and continued the work of building such institutions 
as the educational system, but was ultimately brought down by mass 
protest, just as it had come to power on the back of mass protest 
Pakistan was simply unable to evolve strong political institutions 
which made military intervention unnecessary—  ora military capable of 
governing without reliance upon these very fragile political 
institutions, the fact that the generals (especially Yahya) were 
unwilling to trust the politicians only contributed to the 
irresponsibility of the latter
The ultimate failure of military nerve took place m  1971 when 
Yahya refused to allow Sheikh Mujib to form a government Had he done 
so Pakistan would certainly have survived intact, albeit m  slightly 
different form But again parochial regional pressures were too great
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to resist, and Zulfiqar All Bhutto shares responsibility for the 
break-up of Pakistan by his unwillingness to see Mujib become Prime 
Minister
Throughout Pakistan’s tumultuous history only one institution 
remained untouched--the military It was too powerful for any 
civilian to tamper with, and virtually ran itself without outside 
interference It's important, therefore, to examine how the military 
itself has survived, especially as Pakistan is witnessing the 
decline of parties, bureaucracy, and even educational institutions We 
therefore turn from a macro-survey of Pakistani political institutions 
to a micro-analysis of a few military sub-structures which lie at the 
core of the Pakistan Army
III INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES THE MILITARY 
The Pakistani Officer
The heart of any army is the officer corps, and m  Pakistan the 
officer corps is permanently re-created in the Himalayan hill station 
of Kakul, nearly eighty miles from Rawalpindi, where the Pakistan 
Military Academy (PMA) is situated All officers m  the army pass 
through the PMA, which remains one of the major shaping influences on 
their lives
The PMA was founded in 19*48 to turn "gentlemen cadets" into 
junior officers and was modeled on the Indian Military Academy, which 
in turn had been created (m  193*0 as a more elaborate version of 
Sandhurst The very idea of such an institution was ridiculed by many 
British officers who were convinced that Indians could not become 
gentlemen or officers, they did recruit what they took to be 
gentlemen— the sons of the landed aristocracy and Indian professional
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classes— but it took World War II to convince the British that Indians 
could serve as professionals
The PMA attempts to recreate the Western professional officer out 
of young men who are more truly Pakistani than they are Western Ihe 
new cadets at the PMA do know English, or soon learn it, but their 
reference points are largely within the Subcontinent, not outside of 
it
This is a critical point Can an individual, entirely the 
product of Pakistani society, become a professional officer comparable 
to his Western counterpart'? Toynbee, for one, represented a body of 
British opinion when he wrote that ’’the secret of the West’s 
superiority to the rest of the world m  the art of war is not to
be found just m  Western weapons, drill, and military training ” 
Rather the Western art of war was one facet of Western society as a 
whole, and an ’»alien society that tried to acquire the art without 
attempting to live the life was bound to fail "•*
Toynbee is incorrect Adopting the ’’Western art of war” is 
related to a ’’Western way of life,” but it is possible to retain and 
live a Pakistani way of life This is so not only because middle 
class Pakistan is influenced by Western patterns and models, but 
because young officers have been able to compartmentalize their lives 
and still handle demands from profession and society
But what happens when such demands are in conflict9 Many 
Pakistani officers are quick to point out the danger of allowing 
traditionally acceptable practices to erode professional values 
Accepting bribes, allowing relatives to profit from inside knowledge, 
treating soldiers as servants rather than with respect and dignity,
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are all practices m  the grey area between cultures they have 
increased m  recent years as officers have been overwhelmingly drawn 
from what Pakistani officers call the "same stock" as the rest of the 
country and are subject to the same temptations and corruptions 
Writings addressed to the young officer are filled with warning about 
such temptations Even the highest ranking officers have been 
criticized for yielding to temptation
Openings for personal aggrandizement were, of course, available 
only to the few, but the many used to note such things as cheap loans 
and cheap housing, trips overseas, availability of cars, and the 
provision of rest houses together with all the necessary comforts with 
which to pass the long night 0
The present cadets at the PM A are a far cry from those that 
entered the Indian Military Academy in the 1930s and 19M0s (and who 
dominated the Indian and Pakistan armies for many years) Their 
English language skills are inferior, and they typically come from 
middle-class rural families, or are the sons of Junior Commissioned 
Officers, although each PMA class has a sprinkling of sons from the 
great military families of Pakistan— whose forefathers have served m  
the Indian and Pakistani armies for three or four generations, and 
before that may have seen service in the Mughal or Afghan army
The PMA is today undergoing a series of reforms and changes m  
response to both professional demands and changes m  Pakistani 
society The present PMA pattern is quite different from Sandhurst 
and more like that of the four-year West Point, where both academic 
and military subjects are taught The entrant to the PMA is a 
matriculate and is trained up to the equivalent of the Pakistani BA or 
BSc degree m  two years These degrees are awarded by a cooperating 
university in a ceremony held just after the cadet's commissioning
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ceremony The current PMA curriculum emphasizes academic subjects for 
two semesters (one year) and military ones for two semesters The 
idea of a semester system was borrowed directly from the American 
pattern
Those responsible for the PMA have to deal with one basic fact 
their cadets come from regions and families with very low educational 
standards i and must be given a heavy academic curriculum
At Sandhurst they get boys who already know English, who have had 
good grounding m  science, and so forth, in Pakistan we have a 
national army, anyone may join, and that means that we get boys who 
are not only from public schools, but from all over, from villages 
and they have to be disciplined into a particlular pattern of 
communication, and that is primarily English And English is spoken 
only in educated circles, so we have to bring them up educationally m  
the Academy, and we have to emphasize science '
Thus, more than half of the PMA course deals with purely academic 
subjects, with plans to extend the course by one semester to include 
more academics The goal is to produce an officer who is not only 
technically competent to handle a platoon or command a tank but one 
who is able to continue his professional education and to assume the 
responsibilities of an informed citizen As one senior PMA staff 
member argues
We are m  some ways like a Western army, in that rigid patterns of 
obedience and command will not work A change is a must, and it has 
to come pretty soon m  view of the Russians now being so close 
There*s no way to undo it I think we have got to have more educated 
officers than what we have before A boy reads a book, or a 
newspaper, or even a Newsweek, and he sees something about "credible 
defense", he need not know the details of it but he must know what it 
is the same thing is true of "deterrence we cannot get along with 
the "Koi Hai" officer type anymore
In addition to military and academic subjects, the PMA (like other 
total institutions) attempts to mold and influence the character of
its members Personality and character count for half of the weight 
in an internal evaluation scheme (academic and military subjects each 
carry 25%) and PMA staff speak of this in terms of "leadership, power 
of decision, initiative, will-power, character, organizing ability, 
intelligence, imagination, moral courage, sense of duty, sense of 
responsibility, and self-discipline " Cadets are measured on these 
criteria during their stay at the PMA, and there is random follow-up of 
officers throughout their careers in an attempt to measure the success 
of the PMA curriculum against actual field performance The goal is 
to determine whether the PMA as an institution is getting and 
producing the "right type" of officer
An indirect measure of the success of the PMA is the 
effectiveness of the internal discipline system at Kakul The PMA has 
a partial honor system m  which cadets are required to inform on those 
they discover cheating, or even turn themselves m  to authorities 
Such honor systems have not always been effective at West Point and 
Annapolis, in American as well as Pakistani culture there is a tension 
between traditional and personal social ties, the fear of failure, and 
the injunctions of the honor code The limited effectiveness of the 
honor code at Kakul has led some to challenge it entirely on the 
grounds that it is a foreign, "Western" device, and runs counter to 
Pakistan’s underlying value system, codified m  Islam
It is unlikely that there will ever be perfection m  officer 
production at the PMA, but the system has been successful in at least 
maintaining reasonable standards of competence and professionalism 
This is particularly evident when one examines the performance of 
Pakistani officers in battle, as military advisor in other nations,
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and as instructors m  more advanced military schools in Pakistan 
(which now tram a large number of foreign officers) At least with 
regard to perpetuating the military as an institution the army has 
been successful, and the PMA is both symbol and explanation of this 
relative success Yet when it comes to a broader canvas— the 
military’s attempt to perfect and improve civilian politics— there is 
a more dismal record
The Army, Islam, and Pakistan
After Independence there was little detectable concern about the 
relationship between the military, Islam, and the state of Pakistan 
Other than trivial steps such as replacing British slogans and symbols 
with Islamic ones, there was no outward change in the appearance of 
the officer corps and various military establishments Primary 
attention had been given to building an oramzation and the 
development of strategic doctrine The close relationship first with 
the British and then the American military encouraged deferral of the 
issue of Islam it was enough that the army served an Islamic state
Slowly, however, things began to unravel The failure of the 
Pakistani political system to hold together (and to even hold the 
state together), coupled with the recruitment of officers from more 
traditional sectors of Pakistani society gradually increased the 
salience of the question of the relationship between army and state in 
an Islamic country Officers began to ask what international models 
might be more relevant to their army than the secular British or 
American patterns, and the military have begun to take seriously 
Islamic history and Koranic doctrine, although the basic institutions 
of the army, such as the PMA, still follow Western lines The present
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army is an uneasy blend, especially m  matters of doctrine, socially, 
the army is increasingly "Islamic" in that regulations against 
drinking are now seriously enforced (although prayer is left up to the 
individual and technical military subjects remain untouched)
Comparatively, the most relevant model is the Israeli defense 
force Pakistanis respect the mix of democracy, religion, and 
fighting qualities that they see m  Israel (although they certainly 
oppose Israeli policy), and would like to see Pakistan emerge as a 
kind of Islamic Israel There are other analogies seen by the 
military One distinguished retired general argues that Pakistan 
"cannot have an army and a political system which is derived from 
secular, western models The comparison should be with the Catholic 
states of Europe how long did they take to work out a relationship 
between the army and the state7" This view seems to be accepted by the 
present military leadership, and more closely resembles Iqbal's 
philosophy of autonomous Muslim states than Jinnah's semi-secular 
Pakistan (Iqbal criticized the West for having lost touch with its 
spiritual Christian moorings )
Under President Zia, perhaps for the first time in Pakistan's 
history, there is a systematic attempt to construct a state and an 
army along Islamic lines, yet still be "modern" and efficient In the 
five years since he has come to power Zia has systematically extended 
and reinforced the Islamicization of Pakistan, introducing a number of 
banking and commercial practices based on Islam, punishments drawn 
from the Koran, and has begun the "Islamic" reform of many parts of 
Pakistani society These are familiar through widespread press 
coverage, but it should be noted that some of them were begun by
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Bhutto, in response to popular pressure
The central question is, why has the military pursued this policy 
of Islamicization of the state when many of its own institutions are 
quite un-Islamic m  origin9 Is Islamicization merely a diversionary 
tactic, used by the generals to keep the most westernized segments of 
Pakistan off-balance Or, is the policy due to the fanaticism of Zia 
and his advisors, who truly wish to create an Islamic utopia in 
Pakistan9
Neither answer seems to be true, as far as I can judge Zia is a 
devout Muslim but no fanatic, yet he and others take Islamicization 
quite seriously The view of the senior leadership was best expressed 
by one senior retired general, who provided a full elaboration of the 
way he viewed the weaknesses of Pakistani society, and how Islam is 
both a goal and a corrective
We [the leadership] are progressive and enlightened 
individuals But Islamic laws have been brought in [chopping 
off hands, lashes] Are we hypocrites9 Well, there are 
good laws, but they require a good society, the two things 
have to go side by side The development of the world has 
not been uniform within certain countries also the 
development has not been uniform In the West, for example, 
a law can be enforced uniformly, it will be acceptable 
practically to everybody as being the law at that time, 
because the whole society has grown upward simultaneously 
In the East it is not so In Pakistan, for example, you 
find people who live in caves' You can find people living 
by centuries, till the 21st, leave alone the 20th So, a law 
which a man of the 20th Century considers to be modern and 
civilized is considered to be uncivilized for a man living 
m  the 14th Century And there are people here living m  
caves, in a pre-histonc period'
I think we are trying to civilize people here, whereas in the 
West the people are becoming animals, going towards the other 
direction, for me, homosexuality is such a big crime against 
humanity Chopping off hands for stealing in Pakistan, I 
do not consider to be against humanity You consider such 
things [liberalization of laws concerning homosexuality] to 
be a step forward, we consider it to be against human nature
And, he concluded, expressing the view of virtually the entire
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leadership of Pakistan in the Zia years
We do not accept that the West goes out to impose its views 
on us We do not cry or shout about what Sweden has 
done— they have authorized their children to go to court 
against their parents— now this is destroying human 
civilization which has been developed by this race of human 
beings over centuries It is wrong, totally wrong, but if we 
had done it, the whole of the West would have started 
shouting ’’look how uncivilized and backward those Pakistanis 
are M You people have a friend m  Pakistan You can always 
find fault, but you will destroy us, with what result9 The 
West is looking for an ideal society, but is an imitation of 
that ideal for us9 I think it would depend on the 
situation you cannot impose a proper type of culture, 
civilization, without considering the basic structures of 
that society
The inner tensions and contradictions in this view are clear The 
typical officer is highly Westernized in appearance and values, yet he 
is truly Muslim and Pakistani and rejects much of what he believes is 
the degradation of the West Yet, Islam does not provide a complete 
model or pattern, certainly to these highly informed and cosmopolitan 
individuals The Pakistani leadership is trying to work for an 
amalgamation of two cultures, but it is doing so under enormous 
pressure and without a clear understanding of the difficulty of the 
task Their approach is to draw upon their own professional 
experience and careers if good government works within the military, 
if it can be imposed by adherence to regulations, law, and tradition, 
then the broader society should be amenable to the same kind of 
ortho-social control By 1982, after several years m  power, those 
around Zia who hold these views know that they have not been able to 
persuade many Western-educated Pakistanis of their correctness, but 
this only confirms the degree of un-Islamic rot in Pakistan, and the 
need to persevere
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IV CURRENT DILEMMAS OF STATE-BUILDING IN PAKISTAN
I see four major areas of uncertainty affecting the very survival 
of Pakistan as a state, let alone some degree of movement 
towards social and political justice (however defined) and economic 
prosperity We have touched upon one of these above (the role of 
Islam m  setting standards and providing a guideline for the 
reconstruction of important Pakistani institutions) and others will 
deal with this at length We have also made brief reference to 
Pakistan’s ethnic/regional imbalance, the subject of Selig Harrison’s 
paper
We only add here that the question of Islamic ideology and 
regional power is the heart of the present interrupted endeavor to 
create a new constitution for Pakistan The military presently rules 
m  the name of the 1973 constitution but they have modified so many of 
its provisions by martial law decree that most regard that document as 
practically suspended There i s  a search for a new system, one 
which would possibly give the military a formal constitutional role 
(along the lines of Turkey), but m  recent years even this seems to be 
too risky to attempt (there is still no consensus within the military 
about the propriety of such a constitutional role, since many senior 
officers feel that this would be incompatible with their preferred 
notion of civilian control and might also tarnish the military by 
association)
What has evolved over the past five years of military rule is a 
codified form of martial law in which all three strands of state power 
are retained by Zia— who serves as President, Chief of the Army Staff, 
and Chief Martial Law Administrator Unlike previous martial law
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regimes, the military have tried to share the implementation of 
martial law with civilians and have kept the various civilian 
ministries functioning Zia, in his capacity as CMLA, has been known 
to issue an order to a particular ministry, which m  turn has either 
appealed this through the martial law hierarchy or taken it back to 
Zla U È  the Cabinet (m  his capacity as President) Then, as 
President, Zia has at times reversed the Martial Law directive he 
originally approved The same process has occurred in the four 
provinces where the Governors are also Martial Law Administrators 
(although they do not still direct active military units, having lost 
their Corps commands)
In the eyes of many Pakistanis, this is a poor substitute for 
popular government, but it is not quite the draconian rule often 
associated with military rule elsewhere It is also a feeble vehicle 
for the creation of political habits which would assure some degree of 
stability once martial law is removed and the military withdraws from 
power Indeed, the constitutional issue is closely wrapped up in this 
practical problem of retreat to the barracks, and no proposals for the 
latter are likely to find acceptance in the upper reaches of the
military as long as their very lives are at risk if civilians come to 
power
Two other issues are of only slightly less importance to the 
state-building process m  Pakistan The first is economic policy, the 
second foreign and defense policy
Pakistan's considerable economic achievements in the past were 
due in large part to the strong influence of American and Western 
economic theory and did not lead to any major restructuring of
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Pakistani society Pakistan's class structure is even more sharply 
sloped than India's, the economy remains dependent upon good weather 
and careful management of the complex (but still underdeveloped) 
irrigation system, and the economic differences between urban and 
rural, and Punjab and the other three provinces are self-evident
The present government (and its predecessor) are the beneficiary 
of a boon in the form of massive remittances from the Persian Gulf 
These remittances are uniquely "progressive" m  that they go directly 
to the families of expatriate workers and so far do not seem to have 
created the kind of tensions that growth-from-above did m  the 1960s 
These remittances are now joined by substantial foreign assistance (as 
a result of Pakistan's new strategic importance to the West), some of 
which is targeted for the poorest regions of Baluchistan and NWFP
These new economic inputs have, in effect, bought time There 
stiTl remains the fact that without massive land—reform, and 
investment in agricultural inputs Pakistan will face a serious and 
classic population-food crisis The problem is that even a martial 
law administration is not strong enough to impose change, and no 
elected leadership is likely to perceive a demand for change (except 
from foreign foundations, governments, and their own economists) In 
brief, Pakistan remains in a state of economic drift, although there 
is disagreement over the success of the present martial law regime in 
dampening outright corruption
Pakistan's foreign policy choices are linked to the survival of 
the state in at least four different ways The first, noted above, is 
the tie between dissident ethnic and linguistic minorities and foreign 
governments To some degree Pathans, Kashmiris, Baluchis, and (in the
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future), Sindhis must be placateci, for they do have a limited option 
elsewhere And even with the best will m  the world the Pakistan 
government may find itself under subversive pressure if one or more of 
its neighbors decides to meddle
Second, Pakistan’s heavy defense burden may not only affect the 
growth of the entire economy (there is room for further study of this 
issue), but more certainly affeçts the distribution of resources from
o
province to province About 80% of the military comes from Punjab 
and much of the army is permanently based there, Sindhis in particular 
see little economic benefit from Pakistan's heavy defense burden and 
they and other minority provinces often encounter the military only as 
a hostile force
Third, the army's strategic doctrine is largely Punjab- centered 
The Punjab is seen as the strategic "prize," the area to be defended 
to the end, while the other provinces are thought of more as buffer 
areas or gateways than as vital in their own right This very 
attitude— when directed towards East Bengal—  contributed to Bengali 
resentment over Punjabi/West Pakistani dominance, and there is some 
risk that the scenario might be repeated Punjab, according to army 
doctrine, is the largest, economically most powerful, and 
strategically "front line" province, all of this may be true, but this 
Punjab-centríe attitude is interpreted quite differently m  other 
provinces
Finally, there are some questions about the relationship of 
Pakistan's potential nuclear strategy to domestic politics If 
Pakistan does go nuclear this raises the stakes in any future coup or 
internal disorder Not only will there be a struggle for control over
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such weapons if and when another coup takes place, but foreign
governments will feel that they have a direct and vital interest in
the control over such weapons Indeed, the emergence of an unstable
and disorderly Pakistan as a nuclear power may be too great a
provocation for some neighbors There is a view that once states
acquire nuclear weapons they settle down and become reasonably
trustworthy, I do not think that anyone familiar with Pakistan’s
violent and unsettled tradition of political succession would share 
this optimism
V CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
Pakistan has experienced steady political de-development over the 
past decade Zulfiqar A H  Bhutto’s rule (1971-77) gave some hop— at 
least in its early years-that Pakistan had found a political formula 
that would work, Bhutto knew what had to be done to control the 
military, he initiated a series of far-reaching economic reforms, 
established a mass-based political movement, and conducted a skilled 
and imaginative foreign policy Yet m  the end he was unable to see 
beyond his own ambition, his downfall signalled the end of a great 
experiment and was a reminder that personalista politics could not 
manage as complex and diverse a country as Pakistan The successor 
military regime has been careful to follow a prudent foreign policy, 
but it has further contributed to the demoralization and destruction 
of Pakistan’s major professions the lawyers, teachers, professors, 
journalists and politicians that hold the modern state together
Yet, the military do not have a formula or model of their own, 
except that ’’good government’’ must prevail They are used to such
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government within the rnilitary--and appreciate the virtues of 
obedience, discipline, hard work, and order— and are determined to 
impose it upon the broader society In this they have been aided 
mightily by their enemies— the Soviet Union and Pakistani extrem­
ists— who terrify the average Pakistani
The army is tolerated but not beloved, and Zia's own position 
remains only as secure as his current performance The 
military remain powerful because of their control over coercive force, 
but they have no coherent plan of government, and may suffer the 
consequences of the demoralization of other professional groups and 
institutions m  Pakistan
Since Pakistan has never had an orderly and peaceful transfer of 
power, and since at each stage in the country’s history the political 
institutions that were functioning were further degraded, the prospect 
for the future would not seem to be very encouraging Civilian leaders 
are demoralized and still fear the label of collaborator with the 
military, the moral authority of the military has not increased since 
1977, Pakistan is pressed on both sides by powerful and dangerous 
neighbors, and powerful dissident groups in Pakistan would like more 
autonomy In brief, there are grounds to fear the very destruction of 
the Pakistani state should the present regime falter and no coherent 
successor appear A scenario in which Zia was brought down and 
replaced by a weak or unpopular military junta, which reacted to 
strong civilian demands for a restoration of civilian government, 
leading ultimately to a breakdown of martial law and even civil war is 
not far-fetched, and might also feature foreign involvement, as m  
1971
25
Yet, there are a few important qualities of the present regime 
that provides some hope Oddly, the first is that because of the 
terrible ordeal undergone by the army in the past its senior officers 
(especially Zia) are far more realistic about their external strategic 
and internal political situation The present military leadership 
have no illusions about Pakistan's relative military might, about 
their capacity to govern by force alone, or about the ability of 
Pakistani politicians to govern They also have strong foreign 
support from a number of countries, which has meant a new influx of 
economic assistance, weapons (bought for cash), and political support 
If a balance of Pakistan's prospects for state-build m g  were to be 
drawn, it would not be unfavorable for the short run— the next few 
months or even years But one hesitates to speculate beyond that
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